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1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to make progress toward a testablemodel of pref-
erence change. Economic models incorporating preference changes have typ-
ically been criticized for their lack of empirical power1—e.g. theories of en-
dogenous preferences, human capital, intergenerational transmission of traits,
motivated reasoning, etc. To address this problem, we propose a model of
deliberate preference changes that is sufficiently structured to be falsified yet
quite general. A preference change is deliberate if: (1) the decision maker (DM)
is aware of what has triggered her change of behavior; (2) DM considers that
her new behavior is “better” than her previous one.
Deliberate preference changes are essential to understand the emergence of
new political preferences and consumption behaviors as well as lobbying or
activism. For instance, legal grounds for abortion have expanded in a growing
number of countries since the 1990’s, a phenomenon that is hardly explained
by belief updating or psychological biases and heuristics. More plausibly, the
emergence of new values such as women rights together with the increased
labor force participation of women lead to important changes in our distribu-
tional preferences regarding labor income, labor supply and bargaining power
in the household, etc. Similarly, deradicalization programs rely on the assump-
tion that individuals can deliberately modify their preferences. By involving
the subjects in questioning the drivers of their behaviors, these programs help
them willfully adopt nonviolent views.2 More generally, we want to under-
stand whether some choice reversals are the result of a deliberate behavior
change, as opposed to a “mistake” or non-rational behavior.
We propose a model of deliberate preference changes together with condi-
tions on choice data that falsify it. At a given period, DM makes her choices
by maximizing her preferences on the alternatives. Each alternative is defined
by a set of attributes. DM’s preferences are induced by the subset of attributes
she deems relevant to compare alternatives. Between two periods, DM can de-
liberatelymodify her preferences by changing her set of relevant attributes. For-
mally, such a change is triggered by (1) the awareness of new attributes, and (2)
the maximization of an ordering on preferences themselves—we call this order-
ing themeta-preference. We now describe in more details each component of the
model.
1We also use the expression “empirical content” of a model to refer to the collection of
datasets that falsify a given model.
2See Grune-Yanoff and Hansson (2009) for a review of evidence of preference changes.
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Preferences are represented by (i) an ordering on the alternatives’ attributes—
we call it the attribute ordering—, and (ii) DM’s set of relevant attributes.3 Let us
consider a simple labor market example: when asked “Why did you hire can-
didate x over candidate y?” an employer would explain that x is more experi-
enced, or that y is too shy for this job. Hence, the employer justifies her choice
invoking each candidate’s set of attributes.4 Typically, DM is only comparing
alternatives through the lens of a subset of attributes that are relevant for her
decision. Hence, an attribute is irrelevant if DM does not take it into account
to rank alternatives. The employer might for instance overlook the candidates’
gender for her hiring decision. Importantly, we do not impose that DM is fully
conscious that some attributes are relevant: in the above example, race may
be relevant to explain the employer’s choice even if she does not consciously
discriminate against Black candidates.
Preference changes take the following form: whenever DM becomes aware
of an attribute — through education, social interactions, medias or introspec-
tion — she can decide to make it relevant or irrelevant for the next period,
inducing a preference change. For instance, if the employer becomes aware of
the discrimination against minorities (making her aware of the attribute race)
and if she does not want to be racist in her hiring decision, she can deliberately
ignore race in her future choices by making it irrelevant. Note that the attribute
ordering remains stable, only the set of relevant attributes changes; which im-
plies that if DM deems relevant the same set of attributes from one period to
another, she must make exactly the same choices. We investigate when a suc-
cession of such preference changes is consistent with the maximization of a
meta-preference relation, capturing DM’s moral values, social objectives, norms,
etc. See Figure 1 for a high-level representation of the model.
Note that the constraint of changing awareness on the meta-choice is a key
feature of the model. Would DM be unconstrained in the maximization of
the meta-preference, she would directly reach her most preferred set of rele-
vant attributes at birth. Moreover, the constraint gives rise to interesting path-
dependent dynamics of preference changes.
We assume that the analyst observes a choice correspondence on all menus
in each period, and the set of all attributes the objects possess. The analyst
3Perhaps disappointingly, the model is agnostic as to how DM evaluates these attributes.
For instance, DM could evaluate actions based on their consequences (i.e. consequentialism).
Alternatively, actions could be compared based on whether their characteristics obey some
rules (i.e. deontological ethics).
4There is a connection between what we call attributes and the philosophical works on
reasons; see Dietrich and List (2013a).
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Relevant Attributes Relevant Attributes
Time t Time t+ 1
Choice Choice
Maximization of Meta-Preference
under Constraint
Awareness of some Attributes
Maximization of Preference Maximization of Preferences
Figure 1: The Dynamics of Deliberate Preference Change.
does not observe (and wants to identify) DM’s preferences on the alternatives,
the sequence of relevant attributes, the sequence of awareness and the meta-
preference. We also consider the case where the awareness is observed5—
which is reasonably feasible in experiments—as it substantially increases the
empirical content of the model.
The falsification exercise is difficult because of an indeterminacy problem: we
can always rationalize an indifference between two alternatives either by an
indifference of the preference relation itself (i.e. the attribute ordering), or by
the fact that the attributes that differ between the two alternatives are irrele-
vant (but had DM thought they were relevant, her preference would be strict).
For instance, take two employers whose choices reveal an indifference between
Black and non-Black candidates (ceteris paribus). As an observer, we cannot
distinguish whether it is caused by an indifference of the attribute ordering or
by the irrelevance the attribute race. We say that race is not revealed relevant.
This is important because the two scenarios may lead to different preference
change. Suppose that the first employer considers race relevant but is indiffer-
ent toward this attribute (e.g. because she thinks race has no impact on pro-
ductivity), whereas race is not relevant for the hiring decision of the second
employer (e.g. as a matter of principle, she does not use race in her hiring de-
cision). If they both become aware of an affirmative action policy in favor of
minorities, they may react very differently. For example, the first one may inte-
grate this new attribute to promote Black candidates in the future, whereas the
5In this case, we argue that the awareness can be observed when some attributes are explic-
itly made salient to DM.
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second employer may not change her behavior because she thinks race is irrel-
evant. Therefore the indeterminacy problem relates to the under-identification
of DM’s preferences that we overcome in our model by observing the dynamics
of preference change.
Nevertheless, we show that despite this indeterminacy the model has a lot
of structure due to the time-independence of the attribute ordering. This require-
ment of stability implies that preference changes occur only if DM modifies
which attributes are relevant. Therefore, by observing DM’s choices at each
period, the analyst accumulates some partial knowledge about the attribute or-
dering, and the subsequent choices must be consistent with this knowledge.
This constraint is a key feature of our model. Without this restriction, an ob-
server would have too many degrees of freedom to rationalize a preference
change, hence making the model non-falsifiable. This constraint is imposed at
the expense of some explanatory power. Note however that ourmodel does not
prevent choice reversals—even multiple times—, but it requires such reversals
to be triggered by a complementarity with new attributes DM becomes aware
of. For instance, if the employer prefers the non-Black candidate and then the
Black one, the awareness of a new attribute such as an affirmative action must
explain this change.
Our contribution is twofold: we show that models incorporating changing
preferences can have empirical content.6 Moreover, our model rationalizes het-
erogeneity in choice behavior even under the testable assumption that agents’
preferences on attributes and meta-preferences on relevant attributes are iden-
tical. Indeed, due to the constraint of awareness, the set of relevant attributes
at period t is path-dependent. Hence if two identical decision makers change
awareness on the exact same attributes but in a different order, their choice
behavior and how they justify it will typically differ in the end.
It should be noted that our approach is complementary to a model of belief
updating on some underlying state. Throughout we rationalize DM’s behavior
as if she only changes awareness and not beliefs. This distinction is clearly de-
scribed in Dekel et al. (1998): “an ‘uninformative’ statement—such as ‘event x
might or might not happen’—can change the agent’s decision.” Strictly speak-
ing, we refer to this kind of statement when we mention changing awareness (or
sometimes salience) about the attributes. In Section 4 we elaborate on how one
could integrate beliefs in our model.
6This may include models of chosen preferences, endogenous preferences, motivated rea-
soning, evolving attention, changing awareness, etc., depending on the interpretation of the
objects of our model.
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The idea of representing objects by their attributes goes back to Lancaster
(1966). Moreover we draw on an important literature in philosophy and deci-
sion theory introducing reason-based theories of choice, most notably Simon-
son (1989), Shafir et al. (1993), and Tversky and Simonson (1993). We also draw
upon Dietrich and List (2013a, 2016)’s model of reason-based choice. In partic-
ular, we use their characterization to link DM’s set of relevant attributes with
her preferences on alternatives. Boissonnet (2019) provides a decision theoretic
characterization of our model, and Dietrich and List (2013b) propose a related
theory of non-informational preference change. Our paper should be seen as
the first counterpart of these models within the revealed preference theory.
A recent literature on behavioral revealed preference theory relaxes the as-
sumption of stability of preferences across menus by introducing context de-
pendence. Kalai et al. (2002), Manzini and Mariotti (2007) and Cherepanov
et al. (2013) consider rationalization by multiple linear ordering (possibly ap-
plied sequentially). Salant and Rubinstein (2008) and Bernheim and Rangel
(2009) explicitly introduce a context variable attached to menus. Masatlioglu
et al. (2012) consider a decision maker who may not be fully attentive of all
alternatives in a menu. De Clippel and Eliaz (2012) introduce a model of in-
trapersonal bargaining between different selves. Bernheim and Rangel (2009),
Chambers and Hayashi (2012), Apesteguia and Ballester (2015) and Nishimura
(2018) investigate robust welfare analysis when the decision maker may not
exhibit standard rational preferences. Ok et al. (2015) provide a revealed pref-
erence theory for reference dependent choices. Instead of investigating choice
inconsistencies across menus, our model focuses on explaining inconsistencies
across time. Hence these models typically explore relaxations ofWARP, whereas
our representation imposes within-period WARP with respect to the attribute
ordering, but weaker consistency requirements between periods.
We also emphasize that there is an important literature on “changing tastes”
understood as time inconsistency. Strotz (1955) is the first to uncover the prob-
lem of consistent planning and to investigate how should individuals with non-
exponential discounting make dynamically consistent choices. Peleg and Yaari
(1973) propose a solution based on Markov Perfect equilibrium play against
one’s future selves. Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2005) and Dekel et al. (2009)
provide behavioral foundations of preferences for commitment, namely choos-
ing a smaller choice set for one’s future self to avoid temptation. Sarver (2008)
provides an alternative representation of preference for commitment based on
regret aversion. The main differences with our paper is that they consider de-
partures between expected behavior and actual behavior which is typically not
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deliberate (inconsistent) from the point of view of past selves. Instead, we look
at preference changes that are deliberate but completely myopic, meaning that
DM is unaware of what may change in the distant future.
In the applied theory literature, the closest paper is Bernheim et al. (2019).
Their model and ours share two important ideas. First, they argue that DM can
choose “worldviews” which determine her valuation of future consumption
streams. This is related to our concept of relevant attributes. Second, in their
model DM is constrained by her “mindset flexibility” when changing world-
views. This echoes our constraint on awareness. Despite the differences in
modelling assumptions, their paper is largely complementary with ours as we
focus on the identification and falsification of deliberate preference changes.
Other theories of chosen preferences include Becker and Mulligan (1997), Ak-
erlof and Kranton (2000), and Palacios-Huerta and Santos (2004).
2 THE MODEL
There is a finite number of time periods t = 1, . . . , T and a finite set of binary
attributes7 M. Denote M = 2M the power set of attributes. An alternative is
defined as the subset of attributes it satisfies. Let X ⊆ M be the finite set of
alternatives. Denote K ⊆ X a menu, and let K = 2X \ ∅ be the set of all non-
empty menus. A dataset is represented by a choice correspondence for each
period Ct : K −→ K such that Ct(K) ⊆ K for all K ∈ K .
8 In the baseline
model, the analyst only observes the set of alternativesX and the dataset (Ct)t.
ASSUMPTION 1. (Complete Dataset) We observe Ct(K) for each menu K ∈ K at
each t.
Moreover, we assume that we can always find an object which satisfies any
given subset of attributes.9
7A binary attribute is a property that the object either has or does not have. For instance,
"color" is not a binary attribute but "red" is a binary attribute. Continuous attributes such as
age must be divided in finitely many intervals. Whether the objects belongs to each interval is
then a binary attribute.
8It is important that we observe a choice correspondence instead of a choice function be-
cause most of the axioms rely on the evolution of indifference classes. See Bouacida (2019)
for an experimental method to elicit correspondences. An alternative approach would be to
observe a choice function for each pair of alternatives, with a third option in case DM is indif-
ferent.
9This assumption can be relaxed as long as the set of alternatives has a nested structure—e.g.
X can be a lattice.
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ASSUMPTION 2. (Perfect Instantiation) We have X = M \ ∅.
Denote by Mt ∈ M the set of relevant attributes at period t: this is the set
of attributes that determine DM’s choice behavior at period t. Importantly, DM
may not be conscious of the relevant attributes. For instance, values such as
paternalism, racism, or sexism, may impact her choice behavior without her
realizing it.
Although this is not the only interpretation, our model naturally embeds
inattention to products’ characteristics. In this case the set of relevant attributes
would be DM’s consideration set regarding the alternatives’ attributes.
Application 1: Labor Market Discrimination. An employer wants to hire a
worker. Workers are represented by the following attributes: (m1) “college educated”
or not, (m2) “experienced” or not, and (m3) “Black” or not. The employer’s decision is
based on all attributes, hence the set of relevant attributes isMt = {m1,m2,m3}.
Denote %Mt⊆ X
2 the preference relation on alternatives induced by the set
of relevant attributes Mt at period t. We need structure on how preferences
are linked to relevant attributes, otherwise the model cannot be falsified. Put
differently, DM’s choices must be at least partially informative on the relevant
attributes. We adopt the following representation: for any alternatives x, y ∈ X
and relevant attributesMt,
x %Mt y ⇐⇒ x ∩Mt > y ∩Mt.
where >⊆ M 2 is an attribute ordering, which is an unrestricted weak order
(whose symmetric part is denoted ≃). Dietrich and List (2016) provide a be-
havioral characterization for this attribute ordering. Importantly, this relation
need not agree with the inclusion ordering or the cardinality ordering, i.e. rank
higher an alternative that has more attributes. For instance, an employer may
prefer a candidate who does not have the attribute “Black”, because she implic-
itly associates it to lower productivity due to statistical discrimination. Note
also that the attribute ordering can capture various forms of complementarities
between the attributes. If the employer thinks that human capital depreciates
with age, she may prefer a young educated candidate to an older educated
candidate. At the same time, she may think that without any diploma experi-
ence is crucial, in which case she would prefer an old uneducated to a younger
uneducated.
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Throughout, we assume that the attribute ordering is stable, i.e. it is time
independent. Therefore choice reversals must be explained by DM changing
which attributes are relevant. In particular, DM cannot change her “attitude”
toward an attribute—for instance, because she learns new consequences of
the attribute—while keeping the attribute relevant or irrelevant. Preference
changes must be justified by making relevant or irrelevant an attribute, and
this is an all-or-nothing decision. This is arguably a strong assumption, though
the added structure is essential for the representation.
Application 1 (continued): Ceteris paribus, the employer prefers non-Black can-
didates to Black ones (attribute m3). Hence conditional on any subset of attributes,
Black candidates are ranked lower according to the attribute ordering: {m1,m2} >
{m1,m2,m3}, {m1} > {m1,m3} and {m2} > {m2,m3}.
Between each period, DM becomes aware of a set of attributes At ∈ M—
through education, social interactions, medias, etc. This event enables DM to
modify the set of relevant attributes inducing a behavior change at the next pe-
riod. The constraint that DM is able to modify the relevant attributes only after
changing awareness is an essential element of the representation as otherwise
she would directly reach her most preferred set of relevant attributes and we
could not observe variations in her choices. Hence, we impose the following
constraint on meta-choice: DM can only adopt or reject attributes in At.
Formally, given the relevant attributes Mt and the awareness At, the set of
reachable attributes is:
R(Mt, At) ≡ {M ∈ M :Mt \ At ⊆M ⊆Mt ∪ At}.
This can be interpreted as a “menu” for the meta-choice which consists of all
subsets of attributes that can be obtained from Mt by adding or removing at-
tributes DM becomes aware of. DM deliberately changes her preferences when
she maximizes a meta-preference relation ⊲ ⊆ M 2 on the reachable attributes.
In Section 4, we discuss the multiple interpretations of the meta-preference re-
lation. At this point, it is useful to simply interpret ⊲ as DM’s preference for
consistency in the justifications of her behavior with respect to a set of values
or norms. In our labor market example, suppose the employer is aware of the
attribute “Black” and realizes that her hiring decision is discriminatory. If she
considers this behavior inappropriate, she may want to remove this attribute
from the relevant ones for her future decisions.
DEFINITION: WEAK DELIBERATE PREFERENCE CHANGE. (Ct)t satisfies Weak
Deliberate Preference Change if there exists a stable (i.e. time-independent) weak order
>, a sequence of relevant attributes (Mt)t, a sequence of awareness (At)t and a strict
order ⊲, such that, for any menuK ∈ K , and for any t,
Ct(K) = max({x ∩Mt : x ∈ K},>).
Mt+1 = max(R(Mt, At),⊲).
Rationalization by Strict Deliberate Preference Change is defined similarly,
except that the attribute ordering > must be strict, in which case we denote
it >. As one might expect, the identification with a strict attribute ordering
is substantially easier than with a weak attribute ordering. The latter is quite
challenging because the model is under-determined: we can explain an indiffer-
ence between two alternatives either because DM is indifferent between their
attributes (i.e. indifference with respect to>), or because the attributes that dif-
fer between the two alternatives are irrelevant (i.e. attributes that differ are not
in Mt). Clearly, if we impose that the attribute ordering is strict this problem
does not arise.
Application 1 (continued): DM is aware of the attribute “Black” between t and
t+1. She does not want to discriminate against Black candidates, hence she makes race
irrelevant for her future self. Formally, At = {m2} andMt+1 =Mt \ At ⊲Mt.
In the next section we consider the point of view of an analyst who ob-
serves a sequence of choice correspondences (Ct)t. We address the following
questions: (1) Which choice correspondences are compatible with the model of
Deliberate Preference Change? (2) How canwe identify DM’s preference, meta-
preference, changing awareness, and relevant attributes through her choice?
The objects that are observed by the analyst and those that need to be identi-
fied are summarized in the following table.
What the Analyst Observes What the Analyst Does not Observe
Set of alternatives X = M Relevant Attributes (Mt)t
Choice Correspondence (Ct)t Salient Attributes (At)t
Attribute Ordering >
Meta-Preference D
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3 REPRESENTATION THEOREMS
In this section we investigate the indeterminacy problem and we provide two
representation theorems. This problem relates to the fact that, in our model,
indifferences can be rationalized in two ways. It raises technical difficulties be-
cause verifying that preference changes are consistent with the maximization
of a meta-preference usually requires to identify a unique sequence of relevant
attributes. The first representation theorem by-passes this problem altogether
by assuming a strict attribute ordering—in this case the sequence of relevant
attributes is unique. This representation is simple and provides a new expla-
nation of indifference in standard decision theory: DM is indifferent between
two alternatives if and only if the attributes by which they differ are irrelevant.
The second representation accommodates a weak attribute ordering. Such a
representation is much richer and allows for “background attributes” that only
impact choice indirectly through preference change. This model, however, faces
the problem of indeterminacy, hence we provide conditions on partially iden-
tified objects which are typically not unique.
3.1 The Indeterminacy Problem
The indeterminacy problem relates to the fact that an indifference can be ra-
tionalized either by an indifference of the attribute ordering, or by making ir-
relevant the attributes that differ between the alternatives. For instance, an
employer may be indifferent between a Black and a non-Black candidate (ce-
teris paribus) because she thinks race has no impact on productivity, or because
she does not use race for her hiring decision (even though race could have an
impact on productivity).
To define this problem more formally, we first need conditions that guar-
antee the existence of a transitive attribute ordering > at each period. This
is obtained by imposing the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP) at
each period.
WEAK AXIOM OF REVEALED PREFERENCES. The choice correspondence Ct sat-
isfies WARP at period t if for every K,K ′ ∈ K such that K ′ ⊂ K,
Ct(K) ∩K
′ 6= ∅ =⇒ Ct(K) ∩K
′ = Ct(K
′).
This axiom guarantees the existence of at least one set of relevant attributes
11
Mt such that DM’s behavior can be represented by the maximization of an
attribute ordering >t together with this set.
10 Note that >t is possibly time-
dependent here, and latter we will impose extra conditions to guarantee its
stability.
Let us illustrate formally the indeterminacy problem with three attributes
M = {m1,m2,m3} (see Figure 2). If Ct satisfies WARP, then DM’s choices can
be represented using indifference classes. Say that there are two indifference
classes: {x123, x12, x13, x1} and {x23, x2, x3} where the subscript on each alter-
native describes its attributes. This implies that, irrespective of the attribute
ordering, the attributem1 must be relevant as otherwise DM could not possibly
exhibit strict preference between x123 and x23. Call such an attribute revealed
relevant. In the example, we observe that only m1 is revealed relevant be-
cause it is the attribute that always differs between any pair of alternative from
each indifference class. Therefore, the set of relevant attributes Mt = {m1}
together with the attribute ordering {m1} 6≃ ∅ are candidates to rationalize
DM’s choice. Notice, however, that the grand setM could also be used to ratio-
nalize DM’s behavior as we can fine tune the attribute ordering to reproduce
the indifference classes. That is, Mt = {m1,m2,m3} and the attribute ordering
{m1,m2,m3} ≃ {m1,m2} ≃ {m1,m3} ≃ {m1} 6≃ {m2,m3} ≃ {m2} ≃ {m3}
can also rationalize DM’s behavior. We then face an indeterminacy problem:
DM’s choice behavior does not permit complete identification of the relevant
attributes and the attribute ordering. This is problematic to find axioms that
guarantee various form of consistencies between periods, as the reachable at-
tributes (i.e. the meta-menu) depends on the set of relevant attributes.
The identified set, fortunately, has a lot of structure. We show that any
superset of the revealed relevant attributes—here any superset of {m1}—is a pos-
sible candidate for the set of relevant attributes. To prove this formally, the
following notation will prove useful: for any attribute m ∈ M and for any al-
ternative x ∈ X such that m /∈ x, denote x + m ∈ X the alternative whose
attributes are x ∪ {m} ∈ M .11 Given a dataset Ct, the attribute m is revealed
relevant at t if for some x, Ct({x, x+m}) 6= {x, x+m}.
12 Namely, the attribute
m makes a difference in DM’s choices. DenoteM t the set of revealed relevant
attributes at t: these are the attributes that are necessarily relevant to explain
DM’s behavior.
10Slightly abusing notation, we will use Mt to denote a candidate set of relevant attributes at
a given period t, not necessarily DM’s “true” set of relevant attributes.
11The alternative x+m always exists by Assumption 2 (Perfect Instantiation).
12The menuK = {x, x+m} always exists by Assumption 1 (Complete Dataset).
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tTime
x1 x2 x3
x12 x13 x23
x123
∼
∼
∼∼
∼
∼
∼
Observed Choices
∅
{m1} {m2} {m3}
{m1,m2} {m1,m3} {m2,m3}
{m1,m2,m3}
Candidate Relevant Attributes
Figure 2: An example of indeterminacy. There are two indifference classes (column 2)
and four sets of relevant attributes (together with a specific attribute ordering) that can
rationalize DM’s behavior (column 3).
Proposition 1 shows that: (1) WARP is necessary and sufficient for a choice
correspondence to be rationalized by a set of relevant attributes together with
an attribute ordering; (2) the collection of candidates of relevant attributes is a
lattice.
Proposition 1 (Characterization: Identified Set). The choice correspondenceCt sat-
isfies WARP at period t if and only if the collection of sets of relevant attributes Mt
which rationalize Ct (together with an attribute ordering >t) is a non-empty lattice
denotedM(Ct) (ordered by inclusion). Its infimum isM t and its supremum isM.
It is sometimes important to rationalize DM’s behavior at period t by a set
of relevant attributes Mt which is strictly bigger than the revealed relevant at-
tributes, that is to have Mt ⊃ M t. The attributes Mt \ M t do not have have
a direct impact on choice at t, but they impact how DM changes preferences.
Hence attributes in Mt \M t are referred to as background attributes. For in-
stance, consider an employer who is indifferent toward race—e.g. because she
thinks it has no impact on productivity. Still, the employer thinks that race
is relevant because Black are known to be discriminated against on the labor
market. Suppose that the employer becomes aware of affirmative action poli-
cies that favor minorities at several colleges, thus reducing the informativeness
of the attribute “college educated” for Black candidates. The employer does
not want to discriminate against minorities, hence she decides to make edu-
cation irrelevant altogether. In this example, race acts as a background attribute
because hiring decisions are insensitive to race throughout, but it impacts how
the employer modifies her behavior towards all candidates.
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Despite its importance for a positive description of behavior, this indeter-
minacy challenges the falsification exercise ofWeak Deliberate Preference Change.
Hence, before turning to this issue, we study a more restrictive model in which
we impose the attribute ordering to be strict. In this case, the unique set of
relevant attributes that rationalize Ct isM t (Proposition 2). In the next section,
we provide our first representation theorem which assumes a strict attribute
ordering. The second representation theorem relaxes this assumption, hence it
accommodates background attributes.
3.2 Strict Deliberate Preference Change
The representation consists of four axioms which guarantee various forms of
consistency. The set of revealed relevant attributes M t is uniquely identified
by choice data. Hence it will prove convenient to write some axioms directly
using this set. Obviously, we could have equivalently written the axioms in
terms of choice by substituting the definition ofM t.
We first characterize, with an additional axiom, when we can rationalize a
choice correspondence by a strict attribute ordering, in which case the set of
relevant attributes must beM t. WARP is indeed not sufficient to guarantee the
strictness of the attribute orderings (>t)t. The latter is obtained if DM is not
indifferent between any pair of alternatives that differ by at least one revealed
relevant attribute. Conversely, DM will be indifferent between two alternatives
only if these alternatives differ by attributes that are not revealed relevant.
JUSTIFIED INDIFFERENCE. The choice correspondence (Ct)t satisfies Justified In-
difference at period t if for any alternatives x, y ∈ X ,13
Ct({x, y}) = {x, y} =⇒ (x△y) ∩M t = ∅.
Together withWARP, Justified Indifference characterizes the rationalization
of a choice correspondence by a strict attribute ordering and identifies the set
of revealed relevant attributesM t as the unique possible set of relevant attributes.
Proposition 2. The dataset Ct satisfies WARP and Justified Indifference at period t if
and only if the set of revealed relevant attributesM t is the unique set which rationalizes
Ct together with a strict attribute ordering >t.
13Recall that x△y = (x ∪ y) \ (x ∩ y) are the attributes that belong to x or y but not both.
Hence (x△y) ∩M
t
are the revealed relevant attributes that differ between x and y.
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The stability (across periods) of the attribute ordering is obtained by observ-
ing that choices must be consistent between alternatives that are equally relevant
between t and t′. A useful analogy is that, when alternatives are “perceived”14
equivalently through the lens of the set of revealed relevant attributes, the choice
must be the same. Conversely, if we observe choice reversals between t and t′
it must be that at least one attribute of the alternative was relevant at t and ir-
relevant at t′ (or vice versa). Therefore, choice reversals are only due to changes
in the attributes DM deems relevant.
BETWEEN CONSISTENCY. The dataset (Ct)t satisfies Between Consistency if for
any t, t′, and for any x, x′, y, y′ ∈ X such that x∩M t = x
′∩M t′ and y∩M t = y
′∩M t′ ,
x ∈ Ct({x, y}) ⇐⇒ x
′ ∈ Ct′({x
′, y′}).
Finally, DM’s choices must be compatible with the maximization of a meta-
preference constrained by changing awareness. Characterizing this aspect is
challenging because (1) we do not observe the meta-choices, and (2) only DM
observes and controls the sequence of meta-menus.
At first sight, it might be tempting to simply impose that the sequence of
choice correspondences is acyclic. Namely, that there are no t < t′ < t′′ such
that Ct 6= Ct′ and Ct′′ = Ct. This condition is necessary though not sufficient.
For instance, consider the following sequence of revealed relevant attributes:
M1 = {m1},M2 = {m1,m2,m3}, andM3 = {m1,m2}. We know (from Proposi-
tion 2) that the sequence of choice correspondences is acyclic. Such a sequence,
however, requires DM to become aware of attributes m2 and m3 between the
first and the second period so that M2 ⊆ M1 ∪ A1. But then, {m1,m2} = M3
was also accessible in the first period, which contradicts the fact that DM is
maximizing a meta-preference.
A necessary and sufficient condition is that, whenever we observe “cycles”
of relevant attributes, other (complementary) attributes must have become rel-
evant as well. For instance, if we observe M1 = {m1}, M2 = {m2}, and
M3 = {m1,m2,m3} then m1 is forming a “cycle”. Though, this is compatible
with the maximization of the meta-preference because m1 appears to be com-
plementary with m3, and DM’s awareness can be represented as if m3 was not
in the awareness of the first period.
14Here “perception” should not be interpreted literally but as a simple way to to illustrate
how the set of relevant attributes acts on an alternative: Mt ∩ x.
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DISCOVERY CONSTRAINED CYCLES. The dataset (Ct)t satisfies Discovery Con-
strained Cycles if for any t, t′, t′ > t+ 1: M t′ 6=M t+1 implies that for any τ ≥ t
′,
M t△M τ * M t△M t+1.
If this condition is satisfied, we can always find a sequence of changing
awareness (At)t such that DM’s behavior can be rationalized by the maximiza-
tion of a meta-preference. Importantly, note that (At)t need not be “growing,”
namely we need not have At ⊆ At+1 for all t. This is consistent with a deci-
sion maker who does not keep track of everything she has ever been aware
of, hence optimizing her behavior only with what she is currently aware of.
Even though growing awareness seems intuitive, it may not best describe our
thought processes—e.g. it is well-known that the number of issues that drive a
political campaign is quite limited. Ultimately, the plausibility (or lack thereof)
of growing awareness is an empirical question.
The four axioms are necessary and sufficient for the representation and
Proposition 2 identifies (M t)t as the unique possible sequence of relevant at-
tributes.
Theorem 1 (Characterization: Strict DPC). The dataset (Ct)t is rationalizable by
Strict Deliberate Preference Change if and only if it satisfies WARP and Justified In-
difference at each period t, Between Consistency and Discovery Constrained Cycles.
Moreover, (M t)t is the unique sequence of relevant attributes that rationalizes the
dataset.
3.3 Weak Deliberate Preference Change
We now allow the attribute ordering to be a weak order. This is important
to capture the effect of “background attributes” on DM’s preference changes.
Think of the previous example of two employers whose choices reveal an in-
difference toward race. Say that they become aware of preferential treatment
for minorities in college admissions, thus reducing the informativeness of the
attribute “college educated” for Black candidates. Suppose that the observed
indifference is due to an indifference in the attribute ordering, but that “race”
is relevant to the first employer—i.e race is a background attribute. She may
then decide to make the attribute “education” irrelevant to avoid discriminat-
ing against minorities. This impacts all candidates, and the hiring decision
remains independent of race. On the contrary, if the observed indifference is
due to the irrelevance of “race”, the second employer may now decide to make
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race relevant and discriminate against educated Black candidates. This impacts
only black candidates, and the hiring decision that was independent of race
now depends on this attribute. Therefore, seemingly identical employers may
react very differently due to the presence of background attributes. The main
objective of this section is to understand how background attributes impact
revealed preferences, and how we can adapt the previous axioms accordingly.
The previous axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient due to the inde-
terminacy problem. Let us illustrate the previous axioms with an example
and see why they fail here (see Figure 3). Assume that Ct and Ct+1 satisfy
WARP. At time t, DM’s choices can be represented by two indifference classes,
whereas, at t+1, they are represented by four indifference classes. These indif-
ference classes imply that the revealed relevant attributes are M t = {m1} and
M t+1 = {m1,m2}. Due to the indeterminacy problem, any superset ofM t and
M t+1 can be used to represent DM’s choices (see Proposition 1).
It is easy to see that Justified Indifference is not necessary here: the alterna-
tives x12 and x23 differ by a revealed relevant attribute at time t+1, (x12△x23)∩
M t+1 = {m1} 6= ∅, but we can rationalize Ct+1({x12, x23}) = {x12, x23} (which
violates Justified Indifference) withMt+1 = {m1,m2,m3} and {m1,m2} ≃ {m2,m3}
because we allow for indifference. Conversely, Between Consistency is not suf-
ficient: at period t, the axiom applied to the revealed relevant attribute M t =
{m1} only puts restriction on the stability of {m1} 6≃ ∅. Instead, if the “truly”
relevant attributes at t were Mt = {m1,m3} (i.e m3 is a background attribute),
we should put restrictions on the stability of {m1} ≃ {m1,m3} 6≃ {m3} ≃ ∅.
The indeterminacy introduces a “combinatorial” aspect to the identification
that significantly complicates our objective of finding axioms on choice that
characterize the model. To solve this problem, we provide conditions on par-
tially identified objects, i.e. on “candidate” changes of relevant attributes that
are typically not unique.
As an observer, we want to find out whether changes in choice can be consis-
tent with a meta-maximization. The indeterminacy problem, however, prevents
us from keeping track of a unique sequence (Mt)t of relevant attributes. There-
fore, we shall adopt a more general approach and ask: what are the attributes
that must have changed between any two periods? Instead of working on sets
of relevant attributes, we build our axioms on “candidate” sets of changing at-
tributes to explain DM’s behavior between any two periods t and t′. Such a
candidate typically does not identify a unique sequence of relevant attributes
(Mt)t. This is desirable, as if we were to work directly on candidate sets of rele-
vant attributes, then the conditions would trivially coincide with the definition
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tTime
x1 x2 x3
x12 x13 x23
x123
∼
∼
∼∼
∼
∼
∼
Observed Choices
∅
{m1} {m2} {m3}
{m1,m2} {m1,m3} {m2,m3}
{m1,m2,m3}
M(Ct)
Candidate Relevant Attributes
t+ 1
x1 x2 x3
x12 x13 x23
x123
∼
∼
∼
∅
{m1} {m2} {m3}
{m1,m2} {m1,m3} {m2,m3}
{m1,m2,m3}
M(Ct+1)
Figure 3: An example of the non-necessity of Justified Indifference and of the non-
sufficiency of Between Consistency.
of the model.
Formally, we define an explanation E = (Et,t′)t<t′ of the dataset (Ct)t as an
upper triangular matrix whose element Et,t′ represents a change in relevant at-
tributes between period t and t′. That is, Et,t′ = M△M
′ for some M ∈ M(Ct)
and for some M ′ ∈ M(Ct′). Elements of the row t of this matrix correspond
to relevant attribute changes between t and any t′ > t. Importantly, an expla-
nation is compatible with multiple sequences of relevant attributes (Mt)t, hence
it is a non-trivial exercice to find conditions on explanations that characterize
the model. Conversely, an explanation is typically not unique given a dataset
hence these conditions cannot be interpreted as axioms on choice directly.
A dataset together with an explanation are compatible with a stable at-
tribute ordering if choices between alternatives that are equally relevant between
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t and t′ are consistent. Determining which attributes are relevant, however, is
not straightforward due to the indeterminacy problem. In particular, if an at-
tribute m is a background attribute for all periods then the analyst can never
discover the preference ranking of this attribute. It follows that we should not
impose any form of consistency in the ranking of alternatives that possess such
an attribute. At the other extreme, the analyst directly observes the ranking of
the attributes that are revealed relevant for all periods. Thereforewemust impose
consistency across periods of DM’s choices with respect to these attributes; this
implies that Between consistency is necessary. In-between, some background
attributes are sometimes revealed relevant. Whenever these attributes are re-
vealed relevant, the analyst observes DM’s ranking on these attributes and
therefore we must impose consistency of these preferences. For a given ex-
planation E, let Vt,t′ be the background attributes at t that are revealed relevant
at t′:
Vt,t′ = {m 6∈ Et,t′ : m revealed relevant at t
′ but not at t}
Formally, an attribute m is in Vt,t′ implies that m is relevant at t
′. Because it
is not inEt,t′ , it did not change between t and t
′. This means that eitherm is also
revealed relevant at t, or is a background attribute at t. In any case, it is relevant
for the choice at both periods. Therefore, choices that are made involving this
attribute must be consistent between t and t′.
The following condition extends Between Consistency to our new frame-
work and guarantees stability of the attribute ordering with respect to (1) re-
vealed relevant attributes, and (2) background attributes that are sometimes
revealed relevant.
EXTENDED BETWEEN CONSISTENCY. An explanation E of the dataset (Ct)t sat-
isfies Extended Between Consistency if, for every t, t′, and every x, x′, y, y′ ∈ X such
that:
x ∩ (Vt,t′ ∪M t) = x
′ ∩ (Vt′,t ∪M t′)
y ∩ (Vt,t′ ∪M t) = y
′ ∩ (Vt′,t ∪M t′)
we have,
x ∈ Ct({x, y}) ⇐⇒ x
′ ∈ Ct′({x
′, y′}).
We now impose some form of coherency on the analyst’s explanation. The
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explanation should not exhibit “gaps” in the sense that any sequence of local
changes of attributes between t and t + 1, t + 1 and t + 2, ... until τ and τ + 1
should be consistent with the global explanation from t to τ + 1.15 For instance,
ifm becomes relevant between t and t+1 in the analyst’s explanation, and then
becomes irrelevant between t+1 and t+2, thenm cannot be used to rationalize
DM’s behavior from t to t+ 2.
NO EXPLANATORY GAP. An explanation E of the dataset (Ct)t satisfies No Ex-
planatory Gap if, for every t < t′ < t′′,
Et,t′△Et′,t′′ = Et,t′′ .
Finally, verifying that choices are consistent with the maximization of a
meta-preference is captured by an acyclicity condition. If the analyst formu-
lates a global explanation between t and τ > t + 1 that is included in a local
explanation from t to t+1, then no attributes should change between t+1 and
τ . If this were the case, the explanation would violate the maximization of a
meta-preference relation.
ACYCLIC EXPLANATION. An explanation E of the dataset (Ct)t is Acyclic if, for
all τ > t+ 1,
Et,τ ⊆ Et,t+1 =⇒ Et+1,τ = ∅.
If the dataset satisfiesWARP and if we can find an explanation of the dataset
that satisfy the above three conditions, then the dataset is rationalizable. The
status of this representation theorem, however, is slightly different than Theo-
rem 1 as conditions on explanations cannot be interpreted as axioms on choice
directly.
Theorem 2 (Characterization: Weak DPC). A dataset (Ct)t is rationalizable by
Weak Deliberate Preference Change if and only if it satisfies WARP at every period t,
and there exists an explanation E of (Ct)t which satisfies Extended Between Consis-
tency, No Explanatory Gap and Acyclic Explanation.
15There is a formal connection between our concept of explanation and the theory of dynamic
systems. In a wide sense, a dynamic system is an arbitrary action of a group (say, the real
numbers) on a set called the phase space. That the evolution follows from a group actionmeans
that the state of the system at any moment of time is fully determined by its initial state: for
a given initial value, the evolution of the system during t periods followed by the evolution
during t′ periods is identical to the evolution of the system during t+ t′ periods.
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3.4 Representation with Observable Awareness
Throughout we assumed that the analyst only observes choices, hence the se-
quence of salient attributes16 (At)t was part of the representation. Yet, in some
circumstances, observing this sequence is a valid assumption, which strength-
ens the empirical content of the model. This can be achieved in a controlled
environment where various attributes are made salient throughout the exper-
iment. For instance, Chetty et al. (2009) show that consumers under-react to
taxes that are not salient by posting tax-inclusive price tags in a grocery store. In
such a context, we arguably observe a dataset consisting of choices and salient
attributes (Ct, At)t. This behavior could then be interpreted as a change of
preference: the salience of taxes makes people question their choice and their
willingness-to-pay.
Similarly in development economics, Dutta et al. (2014) implemented an
“awareness intervention”. The poor results of an employment scheme in In-
dia were possibly driven by the individuals’ lack of knowledge about the ex-
istence and the functioning of the program. Thus, they tested the impact of
raising their awareness about the program—simply by showing them a video
clip explaining the details of the scheme. Again, we arguably observe a dataset
consisting of choices and salient attributes (Ct, At)t.
The representation of Weak Deliberate Preference Change is obtained by
modifying the condition of Acyclic Explanation.
ACYCLIC EXPLANATION*. An explanation E of the dataset (Ct, At)t is Acyclic*
if for any t < t′ < t′′ such that Et′,t′′ 6= ∅,
Et,t′′ 6⊆ At.
Moreover, we need an extra condition which guarantees that the explanation
does not violate the constraint on meta-choice. Indeed, the representation re-
quires DM to only add or remove salient attributes to modify her relevant at-
tributes. Therefore, this excludes “associative memory” or “complementarity”
between salient attributes and other attributes—for instance, we exclude that
the salience of discrimination on race allows DM to change her behavior to-
ward other (non-salient) attributes such as gender discrimination.
16In this section, we use the concept of salience instead of awareness as it seems more plau-
sible to observe the former than the latter. The two notions are valid interpretations of (At)t.
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CONSTRAINED REACHABILITY. An explanation E of the dataset (Ct, At)t satis-
fies Constrained Reachability if, for any t, Et,t+1 ⊆ At.
Theorem 3 (Characterization: Weak DPC with Non-Choice Data). A dataset
(Ct, At)t is rationalizable by Weak Deliberate Preference Change if and only if it sat-
isfies WARP at every period t, and there exists an explanation E of (Ct, At)t which
satisfies Dynamically Consistent Explanation, No Explanatory Gap, Acyclic Explana-
tion*, and Constrained Reachability.
This result is a straightforward adaptation of Theorem 2, hence its proof is
omitted.
4 DISCUSSION
4.1 Interpretation of the Meta-Preference
Strictly speaking, the meta-preference is a purely behavioral object: DM’s be-
havior can be represented as if she were maximizing ⊲ on sets of relevant at-
tributes. Further interpretation of this object is necessarily speculative, and this
exercise is less obvious than interpreting a preference relation on alternatives.
A possible interpretation of the meta-preference is that DM prefers coherent
justifications of her actions. For instance, whenever DM becomes aware that
her actions lead to contradictory consequences, she might decide to change her
behavior to make it internally consistent. If DM wants her consumption be-
havior to be sustainable and she discovers the environmental impact of meat
production, she could decide to make the attribute “meat” relevant and re-
duce her consumption accordingly. The idea of coherent justification can ex-
plain the experimental evidence in Nielsen and Rehbeck (2020). They show
that whenever participants violate stated normative criteria on choice—such as
first-order stochastic dominance or transitivity—subjects are willing to modify
their choices on lotteries to resolve the contradiction. Alternatively, the meta-
preference could represent a form of external consistency with respect to a norm
or a culture.
At the same time, themeta-preference relationmay capturemotivated reason-
ing—which can be seen as the opposite of a preference for coherent justification.
Whenever DM becomes aware of new consequences, she decides to make it rel-
evant or not depending on her preferences over the alternatives. For instance,
if DM wants her consumption behavior to be sustainable but she discovers the
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environmental impact of meat production, she could decide to ignore this as-
pect because she likes meat. This suggests that the attribute ordering and the
meta-preference are possibly related. This interpretation can explain the exper-
imental evidence in Exley (2016). She shows that lack of charitable donations
involve excuse-driven responses to charity risk when participants use their own
money, whereas subjects are insensitive to charity risk when using other peo-
ple’s money.
Therefore, our model provides a unified and testable framework for think-
ing the trade-off between coherency and motivated reasoning in preference
change.
4.2 Universality of Preferences and Meta-Preferences
Our model rationalizes heterogeneity in choice behavior even under the as-
sumption that all individuals share the same preferences andmeta-preferences.
The reason is that preference change is path-dependent, meaning that if two
agents become aware of the same attributes in a different order, they would
end up with different sets of relevant attributes. Let us take a simple example.
Two voters share the same attribute ordering:
{corrupt} < ∅ < {corrupt, right-wing} < {right-wing}
Namely, they prefer a non corrupt right-wing candidate, to a corrupt right-
wing candidate, to a left-wing candidate, to a corrupt left-wing candidate.
Moreover, they share the same meta-preference:
∅⊳ {right-wing}⊳ {corrupt, right-wing}⊳ {corrupt}
Namely, knowing that a right-wing candidate is corrupt is relevant, but if the
candidate is known to be corrupt then her ideology is irrelevant. Say that vot-
ers become aware of the same attributes but in a different order: for the first
voter Ai1 = {right-wing} and A
i
2 = {corrupt}; whereas for the second voter
Aj1 = {corrupt} and A
j
2 = {right-wing}. It is easy to see that after the second
period, the relevant attributes for the first voter areM i2 = {corrupt, right-wing}
whereas the relevant attributes for the second voter areM j2 = {corrupt}. There-
fore the former has a strictly better view of the candidate than the latter.
The hypothesis that all individuals can be represented as sharing the same
preferences and meta-preferences is easily testable: identify the model for all
individuals in a population N and check whether the intersection of the iden-
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tified sets
⋂
i∈N >
i and
⋂
i∈N ⊲
i are non-empty. This hypothesis is potentially
relevant for welfare analysis as we show in the next section.
4.3 Normative Analysis
Welfare analysis with changing preferences is a notoriously hard problem. In
this section, our objective is simply to clarify why normative analysis is difficult
in this context, and to propose avenues for future research.
The first obstacle is the question of commensurability: is there a common
standard (or unit) to compare improvements along the preference relation and
along the meta-preference relation? Put in decision theoretic terms, is there a
utility representation of Deliberate Preference Change that aggregates the pref-
erence ordering and the meta-preference ordering? It is not obvious how the
two should interact in a functional representation as improvements along the
meta-preference relation could reduce DM’s satisfaction. For instance, moving
toward sustainable consumption is certainly not enjoyable for most people, but
they still think it is important to protect the environment.
The second obstacle is the question of time-separability: should welfare in-
clude current consumption, future consumption as well as the timing of prefer-
ence change? This last point is key when we think of education: when should
we make students aware of a new concept or problem? Common sense sug-
gests that the timing of preference change is not welfare neutral, and this is
partly captured by the path-dependence of preference change in our model.
This suggests that two different paths (Mt)t and (M
′
t)t that are equivalent up
to a reordering and such that M1 = M
′
1 and MT = M
′
T need not be welfare
equivalent.
Themost established normative theorywhich accounts for preference changes
might be the “equal opportunity for welfare” proposed byArneson (1989). This
is a theory of distributive justice that tolerates inequalities of the positions indi-
viduals reach only if individuals are responsible for these inequalities (through
their choices). If DM decides to stay unemployed, and if she is responsible
for this choice, then DM being poorer than the average worker is acceptable ac-
cording to this theory. That being said, how can society guarantee that people’s
responsibility is effective? Arneson argues that this is the case if (1) individuals
face equivalent menus of options according to their potential preferences, and
(2) individuals are equally aware of these options. Our model allows—at least
theoretically—an implementation of the equal opportunity for welfare.
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4.4 Belief Updating
We assume throughout that DM only changes awareness and not beliefs. Of
course this is quite unrealistic. In order to accommodate belief updating, one
might formally incorporate consequences and attribute-consequence links—
namely, DM’s perception of how attributes map to consequences. We can then
extend the concept of relevant attributes to relevant attribute-consequence links.
DM entertains different beliefs as towhat is the “correct” set of attribute-consequence
links—in this sense DM is Bayesian—but when she becomes aware of new con-
sequences she decides whether tomake it relevant or not according to hermeta-
preference—in this sense DM is not Bayesian. In the latter case, DM needs to
reweight her beliefs as the state space has expanded, and similarly if the state
space shrinks.
These ideas are reminiscent of Karni and Vierø (2013) and Dietrich (2018)
who extend the Savagian model to accommodate changing awareness. They
propose axiomswhich guarantee that the relative probabilities are kept constant
when DM changes awareness, however they lack a theory of how DM chooses
the absolute probabilities on the new state space. The meta-preference relation
extended to the domain of attribute-consequence links could possibly fill this
gap.
5 CONCLUSION
Empirical evidence on choice variations across time and choice heterogeneity
across individuals seem incompatible with the stability of preferences or a sim-
ple model of belief updating. Various theories have been proposed to address
this issue, but they typically lack empirical content. In this paper, we make
progress toward a testable theory of preference change that embeds the act of
discovery which is key in the formation of preferences. Each alternative is rep-
resented by a set of binary attributes, and DM’s preferences over alternatives
are directly defined on sets of attributes. When comparing two alternatives,
DM’s behavior is determined by a subset of relevant attributes. Whenever DM
is aware of a set of attributes, she can decide to make it relevant or irrelevant for
the her next period choices. This preference change is rational if it is consistent
with the maximization of a meta-preference relation under the constraint that
preference changes are driven by awareness.
We provide a behavioral characterization of this model consisting of four
axioms. First, choices must satisfy WARP at each stage so as to be consistent
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with the maximization of a preference relation. The attribute ordering is strict
if and only if DM does not exhibit indifference between alternatives that differ
by revealed relevant attributes. The stability of the attribute ordering requires
consistency of choice across time for alternatives that are equally relevant. Fi-
nally, the sequence of revealed relevant attributes must be acyclic with respect
to previously accessible sets of relevant attributes so as to be consistent with
the maximization of a meta-preference.
We then argued that extending the representation to weak attribute order-
ings is important because it allows “background attributes.” These are at-
tributes that drive preference change, even though they do not impact choice
directly. This general model creates an indeterminacy problem as DM’s indif-
ference can be explained either by an indifference of the attribute ordering, or
by the irrelevance of some attributes. The indeterminacy problem makes it im-
possible to obtain axioms on choice directly, hence we provide conditions on
partially identified objects.
Our paper opens new avenues to empirically test models of chosen prefer-
ences, endogenous preferences, motivated reasoning, evolving attention, chang-
ing awareness, etc. Moreover, our model sheds new light on the debate about
the universality of preferences. Indeed, due to the constraint on awareness the
set of relevant attributes at period t is path-dependent. Hence, if two iden-
tical decision makers change awareness on the exact same attributes but in a
different order, their choice behavior and how they justify their changes will
typically differ.
APPENDIX A PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 1 AND 2
For any set S, we denote ∆S2 = {(x, x) ∈ S
2} its diagonal.
Proof of Proposition 1. (Sufficiency) Suppose that Ct satisfies WARP at period t.
First, we show that M can rationalize Ct. In this case, our representation at
t coincides with standard preference maximization because for any x ∈ X ,
x ∩M = x. By WARP, there exists a preference relation (weak order) %t⊂ X
2
such that Ct can be represented by the maximization of %t. Identifying >t with
%t yields the desired result.
Second, we show thatM t can rationalize Ct. By WARP, Ct partitions the set
of outcomes into indifference classes: for all x, let It(x) ≡ {y ∈ X : Ct({x, y}) =
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{x, y}}. Set >′t=>t ∩M
2
t , i.e:
>′t= {(x, y) ∈ X
2 : x, y ⊆M t and Ct({x, y}) = {x}}
≃′t= {(x, y) ∈ X
2 : x, y ⊆M t and Ct({x, y}) = {x, y}} ∪∆(2Mt )2 .
Let x, y ∈ X two alternatives and denote x′ = x ∩ M t and y
′ = y ∩ M t. We
denote x\x′ = {x1, . . . , xp} and y\y
′ = {y1, . . . , yn}. We have that x\x
′ ∩M t = ∅
and y\y′ ∩M t = ∅, hence by definition ofM t:
Ct({x
′, x′ + x1}) = {x
′, x′ + x1}
Ct({x
′ + x1, x
′ + x1 + x2}) = {x
′ + x1, x
′ + x1 + x2}
...
Ct({x
′ + x1 + · · ·+ xp−1, x}) = {x
′ + x1 + · · ·+ xp−1, x}
Ct({y
′, y′ + y1}) = {y
′, y′ + y1}
Ct({y
′ + y1, y
′ + y1 + y2}) = {y
′ + y1, y
′ + y1 + y2}
...
Ct({y
′ + y1 + · · ·+ yn−1, y}) = {y
′ + y1 + · · ·+ yn−1, y}
By the transitivity of the revealed preference relation induced by WARP, this
implies that Ct({x
′, x}) = {x′, x} and Ct({y
′, y}) = {y′, y}. Therefore, by WARP,
we get that x ∈ Ct({x, y}) ⇐⇒ x
′ ∈ Ct({x
′, y′}). By definition of >′t, x
′ ∈
Ct({x
′, y′}) ⇐⇒ x′ >′t y
′, which means that the pair (M t,>
′
t) rationalizes Ct.
But because >′t is the restriction of >t to subsets ofM t, it implies that (M t,>t)
also rationalizes Ct.
Moreover, M t is the smallest set of relevant attributes that can rationalize
Ct. By contradiction, suppose that M ⊂ M t rationalizes Ct. Then, for any x,
DM is indifferent between x and x+m for anym /∈ M as x ∩M = x+m ∩M .
This directly contradicts the definition ofM t, i.e., the existence of a z such that
Ct({z +m, z}) 6= {z +m, z} for anym ∈ (M t \M).
Finally, we prove the lattice property. For anym /∈M t, letM =M t+m. Set
>′′t=>t ∩M
2. But becausem is not revealed this implies that:
>′′t=>
′
t
≃′′t=≃
′
t ∪{(x, y) ∈ X
2 : x, y ⊆M t +m and x△y = {m}} ∪ {(x+m, x+m) : x ⊆M t}
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Then, by a similar argument as above, one shows that (M t +m,>
′′
t ), hence
(M t +m,>t), rationalizes Ct. Then, by induction, we get that for anyM ⊃M t,
(M,>t) rationalizes Ct.
(Necessity) Let K,K ′ ∈ K with K ′ ⊆ K, and such that,
C(Mt,>t)(K) ∩K ′ = {x ∈ K ′ : x ∩Mt >t y ∩Mt for all y ∈ K} 6= ∅.
We need to show that C(Mt,>t)(K) ∩K ′ = C(Mt,>t)(K ′).
Let x ∈ C(Mt,>t)(K)∩K ′, i.e x ∈ K ′ such that x∩Mt >t y∩Mt for all y ∈ K,
but because K ′ ⊆ K, we have that x ∩ Mt >t y ∩ Mt for all y ∈ K
′, so x ∈
C(Mt,>t)(K ′).
Conversely, let x ∈ C(Mt,>t)(K ′), then suppose that x /∈ C(Mt,>t)(K) ∩ K ′.
Given that C(Mt,>t)(K) ∩K ′ 6= ∅, there exist y ∈ K ′ such that y ∩Mt >t x ∩Mt,
but then x cannot be in C(Mt,>t)(K ′), a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. (Necessity) The necessity of WARP is the same as for the
proof of proposition 1. Let C a choice correspondence induced by the pair
(M,>). For any x and any m such that m ∈ M and m /∈ x, > ranks strictly
x ∩M and (x + m) ∩M , so C({x + m, x}) 6= {x + m, x}, meaning that every
m ∈ M is revealed relevant, i.e M ⊆ M . By proposition 1, the set of revealed
relevant is the minimal set that rationalizes C, soM ⊆M , henceM =M . From
that, it is easy to check that Justified Indifference is verified.
(Sufficiency) By the proof of proposition 1, we know that (M t,>
′
t) rational-
izes Ct. We show that
≃′t= {(x, x
′) : x ∩M t = x
′ ∩M t}
That {(x, x′) : x ∩M t = x
′ ∩M t} ⊆≃
′
t is a trivial consequence from the fact that
M t rationalizes Ct.
Let (x, y) /∈ {(x, x′) : x ∩ M t = x
′ ∩ M t}. Then, ∅ 6= x△y ⊂ M t. By the
contraposition of Justified Indifference, this implies that that x 6≃′t y. Hence,
since >′t is complete, it ranks strictly x and y and (x, y) /∈≃
′
t. Thus,
≃′t⊆ {(x, x
′) : x ∩M t = x
′ ∩M t}
Furthermore, for anyM ⊃M t, as we show in the proof of proposition 1, by
the definition of revealed relevant, some indifferences must be added to >′t to
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rationalize the choices between alternatives that differ by some attributes not in
M t. This shows thatM t is the unique set of relevant attributes that rationalizes
Ct with a strict attribute ordering.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof of Theorem 1. (Sufficiency). Suppose that (Ct)t satisfies all the axioms. By
the proof of proposition 2, we know that (M t)t is the unique sequence of rel-
evant attributes such that, for each period t, Ct can be rationalized by M t to-
gether with a strict attribute ordering >t defined as follows:
>t= {(x, y) ∈ X
2 : x, y ⊆M t and {x} = Ct({x, y})}
Therefore >t corresponds to the most incomplete attribute ordering that ranks
only subsets of M t. This attribute ordering, however, is possibly time depen-
dent.
We verify that the attribute ordering is stable. Let t and t′ be two distinct
periods, and let x, x′ and y, y′ be such that x∩M t = x
′∩M t′ and y∩M t = y
′∩M t′ .
Then by Between Consistency we obtain:
x ∈ Ct({x, y}) ⇐⇒ x ∈ Ct′({x, y})
which is equivalent to:
x ∩M t >t y ∩M t ⇐⇒ x
′ ∩M t′ >t′ y
′ ∩M t′
⇐⇒ x ∩M t >t′ y ∩M t
⇐⇒ x′ ∩M t′ >t y
′ ∩M t′
where the second and third equivalence follow from the assumption on x, x′, y, y′.
Therefore >t and >t′ agree on all the subset of attributes that they both rank.
Therefore if we define >t,t′=>t ∪ >t′ , we get that >t,t′ ∩ 2
Mt × 2Mt =>t (be-
cause either it ranks sets not ranked by >t′ or it ranks sets on which >t and >t′
agree), and similarly for >t′ . Therefore Ct can be rationalized by (M t, >t,t′) and
Ct′ can be rationalized by (M t′ , >t,t′). Let us now define >
⋆=
⋃
t >t. From the
previous argument, we get that for any t, >⋆ ∩ 2Mt × 2Mt =>t, therefore for
any t we indeed have that Ct can be rationalized by (M t, >
⋆).
Finally, we construct one particular sequence of changing awareness which,
together with Discovery Constrained Cycles, makes the sequence (M t)t consis-
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tent with the maximization of a meta-preference. DefineAt =M t△M t+1, hence
the set of reachable relevant attributes reduces that:
R(M t,M t△M t+1) = {M :M t ∩M t+1 ⊆M ⊆M t ∪M t+1}.
Define the revealedmetapreference relation⊲ by:M⊲M ′ if and only ifM 6=M ′
and there exists t, such thatM =M t and,
M ′ ∈
⋃
t′:t′<t
R(M t′ , At′).
We verify that ⊲ is asymmetric. Suppose thatM ⊲M ′. Let t > t′, such that
M =M t andM
′ ∈ R(M t′ , At′).
First, Discovery Constrained Cycles (DCC) implies that there cannot be any
t′′ > t such that M t′′ = M
′, otherwise this would mean that M t′△M t′′ ⊆
M t′△M t′+1, a violation of DCC.
Second, let suppose that exists t′′ < t such that M ′ = M t′′ . Then if there
exists t′′′ < t′′ such that M ∈ R(M t′′′ , At′′′), this would imply that M t′′′△M t ⊆
M t′′′△M t′′′+1, a clear violation of DCC.
Therefore, we conclude that ¬(M ′⊲M), which proves the asymmetry of ⊲.
We now verify that ⊲ is transitive. Assume M ⊲M ′ and M ′ ⊲M ′′. Then
there exist t, t′, t > t′, such that,M =M t andM
′ =M t′ , and,
M ′′ ∈
⋃
t′′:t′′<t
R(M t′′ , At′′) andM
′′ ∈
⋃
t′′′:t′′′<t′
R(M t′′′ , At′′′)
Noting that since t < t′,
M ′′ ∈
⋃
t′′:t′′<t
R(M t′′ , At′′) ⊆
⋃
t′′′:t′′′<t′
R(M t′′′ , At′′′)
We conclude that M ⊲M ′′, implying the transitivity of ⊲. We can complete it
in any way on subsets that are not ranked yet.
Finally, by definition we have that for every t,M t+1 = max(R(M t, At),⊲).
(Necessity). Suppose that the dataset (Ct)t is rationalisable by Strict Deliber-
ate Preference Change, and let (Mt)t be the sequence of relevant attributes and
> be the attribute ordering. By Proposition 2, the dataset satisfies WARP and
Justified Indifference. By the proof of the same proposition, we also know that
the for every t,Mt =M t.
Let t, t′, and x, x′, y, y′ ∈ X be such that x∩M t = x
′∩M ′t and y∩M t = y
′∩M ′t.
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We have:
x ∈ Ct({x, y}) ⇐⇒ x ∩M t > y ∩M t
⇐⇒ x′ ∩M t′ > y
′ ∩M t′
⇐⇒ x′ ∈ C ′t({x
′, y′})
where the first equivalence is by definition of rationalizability, the second equiv-
alence follows from the assumption on x, x′, y, y′, and the last equivalence is
again by definition of rationalizability. Therefore, the dataset satifies Between
Consistency.
Let t be a given period. We denote t′ = min{τ > t + 1 : Mτ 6= Mt+1.
Hence t′ is the first period period after t + 1 such that Mt′ 6= Mt+1. Let τ ≥ t
′,
by contradiction suppose that Mt△Mτ ⊆ Mt△Mt+1, which violates DCC. The
constraint of awareness implies that Mt△Mt+1 ⊆ At, hence Mt△Mτ ⊆ At, i.e.
Mτ ∈ R(Mt, At). But by the transitivity of the meta-preference⊲, we know that
for any two periods p, p′: p′ > p =⇒ Mp′ ⊲ Mp. Hence Mτ ⊲ Mt+1, which
contradicts thatMt+1 = max(R(M t, At),⊲). Hence DCC is satisfied.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We first need to establish a couple of lemmas that show how the stability of the
ordering provides some structure to the set of candidates we can have.
Let C be the set of choice correspondences onX satisfyingWARP. As above,
for each C ∈ C,M(C) is the lattice of attributes sets that rationalize C (cf Propo-
sition 1). We denoteM the infimum ofM(C).
We also denote by F : C2 7→ M 2 the function that maps pairs of choice
correspondences into the collection of pairs of sets of relevant attributes that
do not yield choice reversals that can only result from a change of the ordering,
i.e. that satisfy the condition of Between Consistency. (M,M ′) ∈ F (C,C ′) if
M ∈M(C),M ′ ∈M(C ′), and for all x, x′, y, y′, such that
x ∩M = x′ ∩M ′ and y ∩M = y′ ∩M ′
we have that
x ∈ C({x, y}) ⇐⇒ y ∈ C ′({x′, y′})
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The following lemma is a classical implication of the transitivity of the re-
vealed preference under WARP. Hence its proof is omitted.
Lemma 1. For all C ∈ C and all x, x′, y, if C({x, x′}) = {x, x′} and x ∈ C({x, y}),
then x′ ∈ C({x′, y}).
Lemma 2. LetC,C ′ ∈ C. For allM ∈M(C) andM ′ ∈M(C ′), ifM∗ ∈M(C),M∗ ⊆
M andM ′∗ ∈M(C
′),M ′∗ ⊆M
′, then
(M,M ′) ∈ F (C,C ′) =⇒ (M∗,M
′
∗) ∈ F (C,C
′)
Proof. Let (M,M ′) ∈ F (C,C ′). We need to show that (M∗,M
′
∗) ∈ F (C,C
′). Let
x, x′, y, y′ such that
x ∩M∗ = x
′ ∩M ′∗ and y ∩M∗ = y
′ ∩M ′∗
By Perfect Instantiation, there exists α, α′, β, β′ ∈ X such that, α = x ∩
M∗ , α
′ = x′ ∩ M ′∗ , β = y ∩ M∗ and β
′ = y′ ∩ M ′∗. Then, since M∗ ⊆ M and
M ′∗ ⊆M
′, we have that:
α ∩M = x ∩M∗ = x
′ ∩M ′∗ = α
′ ∩M ′(1)
β ∩M = y ∩M∗ = y
′ ∩M ′∗ = β
′ ∩M ′(2)
Hence, by (1), (2) and the fact that (M,M ′) ∈ F (C,C ′) we get that
α ∈ C({α, β}) ⇐⇒ α′ ∈ C ′({α′, β′})(3)
Moreover, sinceM∗ rationalize C, α∩M∗ = x∩M∗ and β ∩M∗ = y ∩M∗ we
have that,
C({x, α}) = {x, α} and C({y, β}) = {y, β}(4)
Similarly, sinceM ′∗ rationalize C
′, α′ ∩M ′∗ = x
′ ∩M ′∗ and β
′ ∩M ′∗ = y
′ ∩M ′∗ we
have that,
C ′({x′, α′}) = {x′, α′} and C ′({y′, β′}) = {y′, β′}(5)
32
Applying WARP to both equality of (4) we get that x ∈ C({x, y}) ⇐⇒ x ∈
C({x, y, β}) ⇐⇒ α ∈ C({α, y, β}) ⇐⇒ α ∈ C({α, β}). Similarly with (5) we
get that x′ ∈ C ′({x, y}) ⇐⇒ α′ ∈ C ′({α′, β′}).
So by (3) we have that x ∈ C({x, y}) ⇐⇒ x′ ∈ C ′({x, y}).
Lemma 3. For all C,C ′ ∈ C, if [(M,M ′) ∈ F (C,C ′)] and [m 6∈M , orm ∈M∩M ′],
we have that (M,M ′ +m) ∈ F (C,C ′).
Proof. Ifm ∈M ′, thenM ′+m =M ′, hence, since (M,M ′) ∈ F (C,C ′), (M,M ′+
m) ∈ F (C,C ′).
Assume now that m 6∈ M ′. Thus, m 6∈ M ∩M ′ and m /∈ M . Let x, x′, y, y′
such that,
x ∩M = x′ ∩ (M ′ +m) and y ∩M = y′ ∩ (M ′ +m)(6)
The, we must have that m 6∈ x′ ∪ y′. Otherwise, contradicting the fact that
m /∈M ,
m ∈ x′ =⇒ x ∩M = x′ ∩ (M ′ +m) ∋ m =⇒ m ∈M(7)
m ∈ y′ =⇒ y ∩M = y′ ∩ (M ′ +m) ∋ m =⇒ m ∈M(8)
Thus, x∩M = x′ ∩ (M ′+m) = x′ ∩M ′ and y∩M = y′ ∩ (M ′+m) = y′ ∩M ′,
and the fact that (M,M ′) ∈ F (C,C ′) implies that x ∈ C({x, y}) if and only if
x′ ∈ C ′({x′, y′}). This shows as desired that (M,M ′ +m) ∈ F (C,C ′)
Lemma 4. For all C,C ′ ∈ C,M,M ′ ∈ F (C,C ′), and allm 6∈M ′, if (M,M ′∪¬M) ∈
F (C,C ′), then (M +m,M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∈ F (C,C ′).
Proof. First of all, note that, given thatM ′ ∪ ¬(M +m) ⊆M ′ ∪ ¬M , by Lemma
2, (M,M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∈ F (C,C ′) implies that:
(M,M ′ ∪ ¬(M +m)) ∈ F (C,C ′)(9)
If m ∈ M , thenM +m = M , hence, since (M,M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∈ F (C,C ′), (M +
m,M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∈ F (C,C ′).
Assume now thatm /∈M . Let x, x′, y, y′ such that,
(M +m) ∩ x = (M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∩ x′ and (M +m) ∩ y = (M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∩ y′(10)
We have two cases: eitherm ∈ x ∪ y, orm /∈ x ∪ y.
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Case 1: m ∈ x∪ y. W.l.o.g we can assume thatm ∈ x and sincem 6∈M ′ we have
that
(M +m) ∩ x = (M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∩ x′ =⇒ M ∩ x = (M ′ ∪ ¬(M +m)) ∩ x′(11)
Now, we have that either ifm ∈ y or not.
Subcase 1.a: m ∈ y. Sincem 6∈M ′ we have,
(M +m) ∩ y = (M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∩ y′ =⇒ M ∩ y = (M ′ ∪ ¬(M +m)) ∩ y′(12)
Combining (11) and (12) with (9), we obtain, as desired,
x ∈ C({x, y}) ⇐⇒ x′ ∈ C ′({x′, y′})
Subcase 1.b: m 6∈ y. Since m ∈ ¬M , then by (10), we must have that m 6∈ y′.
Thus,
(M +m) ∩ y = (M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∩ y′ =⇒ M ∩ y = (M ′ ∪ ¬(M +m)) ∩ y′(13)
Combining (11) and (13) with (9), we obtain, as desired,
x ∈ C({x, y}) ⇐⇒ x′ ∈ C ′({x′, y′})
Case 2: Ifm 6∈ x ∪ y. Sincem 6∈M , this implies thatm 6∈ x′ ∪ y′, thus,
M ∩ x = (M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∩ x′ andM ∩ y = (M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∩ y′
Since (M,M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∈ F (C,C ′), we obtain, as desired,
x ∈ C({x, y}) ⇐⇒ x′ ∈ C ′({x′, y′})
Lemma 5. For all C,C ′ ∈ C, (M,M ′) ∈ F (C,C ′), and all B such that B ∩M ′ = ∅,
if (M,M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∈ F (C,C ′), then (M ∪ B,M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∈ F (C,C ′).
Proof. We prove it by induction. For |B| = 1, then there existsm 6∈M ′ such that
B = {m}. Applying Lemma 4, we obtain the desired result.
To prove the induction step, assume that for all B such that B ∩M ′ = ∅ and
|B| = n, we have that if (M,M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∈ F (C,C ′), then (M ∪ B,M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∈
F (C,C ′).
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Let B′ such that B′ ∩M ′ = ∅, and |B′| = n+ 1 and,
(M,M ′ ∪ ¬M) ∈ F (C,C ′)(14)
Note that, givenM ′ ⊆M ′ ∪¬(B′ ∪M) ⊆M ′ ∪¬M and (M,M ′) ∈ F (C,C ′), by
Lemma 2, (14) implies:
(M,M ′ ∪ ¬(B′ ∪M)) ∈ F (C,C ′)(15)
Similarly, let m ∈ B′. Given that M ′ ∪ ¬((B′ − m) ∪ M) ⊆ M ′ ∪ ¬M , by
Lemma 2, (14) implies:
(
M,M ′ ∪ ¬((B′ −m) ∪M)
)
∈ F (C,C ′)(16)
Thus, since |B′ −m| = n by the induction hypothesis we have,
(
M ∪ (B′ −m),M ′ ∪ ¬M
)
∈ F (C,C ′)
Since m ∈ B′ with B′ ∩M ′ = ∅, m 6∈ M ′. Hence, we can apply Lemma 4 and
we obtain, as desired,
(
M ∪ B′,M ′ ∪ ¬M
)
∈ F (C,C ′)
Lemma 6. (M∗,M
′
∗) ∈ F (C,C
′) if, and only if, for all (M,M ′) such that
M∗ ⊆M ⊆M∗ ∪ (M\M
′
∗) andM
′
∗ ⊆M
′ ⊆M ′∗ ∪ (M\M∗)(17)
we have (M,M ′) ∈ F (C,C ′).
Proof. Assume (M∗,M
′
∗) ∈ F (C,C
′). Let (M,M ′) such that (17) is satisfied.
Then, M ′ = M ′∗ ∪ Mˆ
′ for some Mˆ ′ ⊆ M\M∗. We first have by induction on
the size of Mˆ ′ that
(M∗,M
′) ∈ F (C,C ′)(18)
Indeed, for |Mˆ ′| = 0, we have have by assumption (M∗,M
′
∗) ∈ F (C,C
′); and
the inductive step is given by Lemma 3.
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Similarly, there exists Mˆ ⊆ ¬M ′∗ such thatM = M∗ ∪ Mˆ . Each condition of
lemma 5 is satisfied, hence:
(M,M ′) ∈ F (C,C ′)
Proof of Theorem 2. (Necessity) Suppose that the dataset (Ct)t is rationalizable by
Weak Deliberate Preference Change. Let, for all t, t′ such that t < t′,
Et,t′ :=Mt△Mt′
First, by definition of the sequence (Mt)t, (Et,t′)t<t′ is an explanation of (Ct)t.
Furthermore, given its definition, No Explanatory Gap is satisfied.
To show that (Et,t′)t<t′ satisfies Extended Between Consistencywe first show
that for all t, t′, (Mt,Mt′) ∈ F (Ct, Ct′), then we show that M t ∪ Vt,t′ ⊆ Mt,
M t′ ∪ Vt′,t′ ⊆M
′
t , and apply lemma 2.
(Mt,Mt′) ∈ F (Ct, Ct′) is implied by the fact that Ct = C
(Mt,>) and Ct′ =
C(Mt′ ,>) for the same >. Indeed, if x, x′, y, y′ are such that x ∩Mt = x
′ ∩Mt′ and
y ∩Mt = y
′ ∩Mt′ . We have:
x ∈ Ct({x, y}) ⇐⇒ x ∩Mt > y ∩Mt ⇐⇒ x
′ ∩Mt′ > y
′ ∩Mt′ ⇐⇒ x
′ ∈ C ′t({x
′, y′})
For any t, by definition,M t ⊆Mt. Furthermore, for any t
′, letm ∈ Vt,t′ ; then
m ∈ M t′ ⊆ Mt′ and m 6∈ Et,t′ , thus, m ∈ Mt. Which implies that Vt,t′ ⊆ Mt.
HenceM t ∪ Vt,t′ ⊆Mt. A similar reasoning implies thatM t′ ∪ Vt′,t ⊆Mt′ .
Then, by Lemma 2, given that (Mt,Mt′) ∈ F (Ct, Ct′), we obtain that (M t ∪
Vt,t′ ,M t′ ∪ Vt′,t) ∈ F (Ct, Ct′). This completes the proof that Extended Between
Consistency is satisfied.
To show that (Et,t′)t<t′ satisfies Acyclic Explanation, consider t and τ > t+1.
Suppose that Et,τ ⊂ Et,t+1. Given that Et,t+1 ⊆ At (becauseMt+1 ∈ R(Mt, At)),
this means that Mτ ∈ R(Mt, At). Because, Mt+1 = max(R(Mt, At),⊲), this im-
plies thatMτ =Mt+1, hence Et+1,τ = ∅.
Sufficiency: Suppose that the dataset (Ct)t satisfies WARP at every period t and
there is an explanation E that satisfies Extended Between Consistency, No Ex-
planatory Gap and Acyclic Explanation.
Step 1: We first build the candidate sequences (M∗t , At) that rationalizes (Ct)t.
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We define for all t
E(M(Ct), Et,t+1) =
⋃
M∈M(Ct)
{M ′ ∈M(Ct+1) :M△M
′ = Et,t+1}
From these objects, we define recursively a sequence Lt as follows:
L1 =M(C1)
∀t ≥ 2 Lt = E(Lt−1, Et−1,t)
Note that these sets are never empty since (Et,t′)t<t′ explains (Ct)t.
We can define the following sequence (M∗t )t:
M∗T ∈ argmin
M∈LT
(#M)
∀ t ≤ T − 1 M∗t ∈ argmin
M∈Lt s.t. M△M∗t+1=Et,t+1
(#M)
Let At = M
∗
t△M
∗
t+1 = Et,t+1 for all t. Furthermore, given that (Et,t′)t<t′ sat-
isfies No Explanatory Gap, for all t, t′, t′ > t, Et,t′ =M
∗
t△M
∗
t′ .
Step 2: We show that for every t, t′, (M∗t ,M
∗
t′) ∈ F (Ct, Ct′)
Note that, similarly to what was proved for the necessity part:
M t ∪ Vt,t′ ⊂M
∗
t andM t′ ∪ Vt′,t ⊂M
∗
t′(19)
Indeed, consider m ∈ Vt,t′ . Thus m /∈ Et,t′ and m ∈ M t′ ⊆ M
∗
t′ , therefore,
m ∈ M∗t . Hence we get that M t ∪ Vt,t′ ⊂ M
∗
t . The same reasoning applies to
showM t′ ∪Vt′,t ⊂M
∗
t′ . Which implies thatM
∗
t = (M t ∪Vt′,t)∪
(
M∗t \(M t ∪Vt,t′)
)
andM∗t′ = (M t ∪ Vt′,t) ∪
(
M∗t \(M t′ ∪ Vt′,t)
)
Furthermore, let m ∈ M∗t \(M t ∪ Vt,t′). If m ∈ Et,t′ , then m /∈ M
∗
t′ hence
m /∈M t′ . Ifm /∈ Et,t′ , sincem /∈ Vt,t′ we havem /∈M t′ . Thus,
m ∈M∗t \(M t ∪ Vt,t′) =⇒ m /∈M t′(20)
Similarly, one can show that,
m ∈M∗t′\(M t′ ∪ Vt′,t) =⇒ m /∈M t(21)
Extended Between Consistency implies that (M t ∪ Vt,t′ ,M t′ ∪ Vt′,t) ∈ F (Ct, Ct′).
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Therefore, by (20) and (21) and Lemma 6 we infer that
(M t ∪ Vt,t′ ,M t′ ∪ Vt′,t) ∈ F (Ct, Ct′) =⇒ (M
∗
t ,M
∗
t′) ∈ F (Ct, Ct′)
Step 3: We build a stable attributes ordering >⋆ such that for any t, Ct = C
(M∗t ,>
⋆).
We proceed similarly as in the proof of Theorem 1. We denote by >t the
most incomplete attribute ordering such that Ct = C
(M∗t ,>t), that is >t only
ranks subsets ofM∗t (only non-empty ones ifM
∗
t is the grand set).
Let t and t′ be two distinct periods, and let x, x′, y, y′ be such that x ∩M∗t =
x′∩M∗t′ and y∩M
∗
t = y
′∩M∗t′ . Then by step 2we know that (M
∗
t ,M
∗
t′) ∈ F (Ct, Ct′),
so
x ∈ Ct({x, y}) ⇐⇒ x
′ ∈ Ct′({x
′, y′})
which is equivalent to:
x ∩M∗t >t y ∩M
∗
t ⇐⇒ x
′ ∩M∗t′ >t′ y
′ ∩M∗t′ .
This means that>t and>t′ agree on all the sets of attributes that they both rank.
Hence, if we define >t,t′= >t ∪ >t′ , we get that >t,t′ ∩ 2
M∗t × 2M
∗
t = >t (because
either it ranks sets not ranked by>t′ or it ranks sets on which>t and>t′ agree),
and similarly for >t′ . This means that Ct = C
(M∗t ,>t,t′ ) and Ct′ = C
(M∗
t′
,>t,t′ ).
Let us now define >⋆=
⋃
t >t. From the previous argument, we get that
for any t, >⋆ ∩ 2M
∗
t × 2M
∗
t = >t, therefore for any t we indeed have that
Ct = C
(M∗t ,>
⋆).
Step 4: Show that for all t, t′, with t < t′, if M∗t′ ∈ R(M
∗
t , At), then for all t
′′, with
t < t′′ < t′,M∗t′′ =M
∗
t′ .
We know that Et,t′ = M
∗
t△M
∗
t′ , hence, M
∗
t′ ∈ R(M
∗
t , At) implies that Et,t′ ⊆
At = Et,t+1. By Acyclic Explanation, this implies that Et+1,t′ = ∅. Hence
Et+1,t′ ⊂ Et+1,t+2, and by applying Acyclic Explanation, we obtain that Et+2,t′ =
∅. By iterating Acyclic Explanation, we obtain that Et′′,t′ = ∅ which means that
M∗t′′ =M
∗
t′ .
Step 5: We build the meta-preference and show that it is asymmetric and transitive.
Define the metapreference ⊲ as follows: M ′ ⊳M if M 6= M ′ and ∃t, such
thatM =M∗t and,
M ′ ∈
⋃
t′:t′<t
R(M∗t′ , At′)
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Assume thatM ′⊳M , and let t such thatM =M∗t . We know from Step 4 that
if there exists t′ < t such that M ∈ R(M∗t′ , At′) then M
∗
t = M
∗
t′ . Furthermore,
for any t′′ > t, M∗t′′ 6= M
′, otherwise, given that M ′ ∈
⋃
t′:t′<tR(M
∗
t′ , At′), by
iterating Step 4, this would imply thatM ′ =M∗t , a contradiction.
So we can conclude that ¬(M ⊲M ′), which establishes the asymmetry of⊲.
Now assumeM ′′⊳M ′ andM ′⊳M . Then there exist t, t′ such that,M =M∗t
andM ′ =M∗t′ , and,
M ′′ ∈
⋃
t′′:t′′<t′
R(M∗t′′ , At′′) andM
′ ∈
⋃
t′′′:t′′′<t
R(M∗t′′′ , At′′′)
From the previous argument, note that t′ < t, hence,
M ′′ ∈
⋃
t′′:t′′<t
R(M∗t′′ , At′′) ⊆
⋃
t′′′:t′′′<t′
R(M∗t′′′ , At′′′)
We conclude that M ′′ ⊳M which proves the transitivity of ⊲. We can finally
complete it in any way on subsets that are not ranked yet.
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